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Deregulation 
Public Law 96-221 -the Depository Institu-
tions Deregu lation and Monetary Control 
Act-has been on the books for only four 
months' time, but it is already living up to its 
billing as the most far-reaching piece offinan-
ciallegislation ofthe past generation. Contro-
versy has developed around several sections 
of  the legislation. However, most of  the argu-
ments to date have centered around Title II 
(Depository Institutions Deregulation), which 
established mechanisms for phasing-out de-
posit interest-rate ceilings within a six-year 
period. 
In moving toward deregulation, Congress 
asserted that statutory limitations on savings 
interest rates actually discouraged savings, 
created inequities for depositors, and hin-
dered depository institutions in competing for 
funds-and also failed to achieve their in-
tended purpose of providing an even flow of 
funds for home financing. Congress thus set 
up a Deregulation Committee to achieve its 
mandate, with a membership consisting of 
the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Chairmen of  the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board and the National Credit Union Admin-
istration, along with the (non-voting) Comp-
troller of  the Currency. 
Congress specifically instructed the Commit-
tee to provide savers with a market rate of 
return by increasing all rate ceilings "as soon 
as feasible," with "due regard for the safety 
and soundness of depository institutions." 
The Committee's powers are limited in sev-
eral ways. During the phase-out period, it 
can't eliminate the quarter-percentage-point 
differential which thrift institutions can pay 
over commercial-bank rates on passbook 
savings and other categories of time and sav-
ings accounts authorized as of December 
1975. (Thus, that restriction does not apply to 
the money-market and small-saver certifi-
cates developed during the past several 
years.) Again, the legislation does not even 
address the most formidable rate ceiling-
the outright prohibition of interest payments 
on demand deposits. But on balance, Con-
gress clearly intended to eliminate rate ceil-
ings on time deposits after a six-year period. 
Critical decisions' 
The Deregulation Committee's initial actions 
this spring were welcomed by most bankers 
and household savers, but generally criti-
cized by thrift institutions and home builders. 
One committee proposal, not yet imple-
mented, would prohibit depository insti-
tutions from offering premiums or gifts 
("freebies") to depositors opening new ac-
counts or adding to existing ones. Critics have 
argued that this proposal would involve 
more, rather than less, regulation, and that it 
would deprive institutions of  a useful market-
ing tool. Defenders of  this move, on the other 
hand, have argued that it wou  Id be consistent 
with the planned phase-out of ceilings on the 
payment of  expl icit interest, and with the gen- -
eral movement toward the use of explicit 
prices rather than implicit prices (with pre-
miums) for financial services. 
In another action designed to help depository 
institutions compete more effectively for de-
posits, the committee moved to liberalize rate 
ceilings on the popular money-market and 
small-saver certificates. (The rate on MMC's 
is tied to the six-month Treasury-bill auction 
yield, while the rate on small-saver certifi-
cates is tied to the thirty-month Treasury-note 
yield.) Among other rulings, the committee 
narrowed the range in which thrifts may pay 
the full quarter-percent differential to the 
7.5-8.5 percent spectrum of bill rates, and 
allowed commercial banks a one-time "roll-
over" bonus on maturing MMC's at the 
thrifts' ceiling rate. Thrift institutions argued 
strongly againstthese rulings; in fact, the u.s. 
League of Savings Associations filed suit to 
void the committee's actions, partly on the 
grounds that only one ofthe committee mem-bers "has a primary statutory duty to provide 
for sound and economical home financing." 
Much of the controversy centers around the 
thrift institutions' fear that their loss of  the 
quarter-point differential on rate ceilings 
would reduce the flow offunds into mortgage 
finance-including perhaps a $17-billion 
loss this year because of the banks' ability to 
offer the rollover bonus on maturing MMC's. 
But the banks respond that they too would 
channel new flows of funds into housing; in 
the San "Francisco Reserve District, for ex-
ample, weekly reporting banks hold a larger 
proportion of their loan portfolios in real-
estate than in business loans ($47 billionvs. 
$33 billion). 
Major issues 
The response to arguments such as these 
may well influencethe pace atwhich deposit 
interest-rate ceilings are phased out, or 
perhaps decide whether they will ever be 
completely eliminated. One major question 
centers on the role of  housi ng in the economy 
and the extent to which it should be afforded 
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priority treatment. A related issue is the via-
bility of the thrifts and their ability to operate 
in an environment without rate ceilings. In 
the new legislation, Congress required each 
member of the Deregulation Committee to 
prepare an annual report specifically ad-
dressing these questions. Each report is to 
include recommendations designed to assure 
a steady flow of  funds into the housing sector, 
and to assess the impactof  uninsured money-
market innovators (such as money-market 
mutual funds) in reducing the flows of  funds 
into insured banks and thrift institutions. 
The deregulation game plan, as laid out in 
the basic legislation, contains several me-
chanisms for helping thrifts adjust to the 
new environment, including provisions for 
substantially broadening their third-party 
payment and lending authority. To the same 
end, the legislation authorizes a Federal over-
ride of state usury ceilings on mortgage rates, 
although states could forestall that move by 
imposing new ceilings within four years of 
passage of  the act. Meanwh  i  Ie, over con-
sumer-group opposition, the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board has authorized member in-
stitutions to offer renegotiable mortgages, re-
sembling the Canadian-type "rollover" 
mortgage-reflecting Chairman Jay Janis' 
view that "thrifts cannot pay savers a market 
rate of return" unless they can obtain a mar-
ket rate of return on their loans. 
In recent weeks, the Bank Board has pro-
posed several specific steps that would 
broaden thrift-institution powers under the 
new law-and in the process, assist first-time 
home buyers. The regu lations wou  Id raise the 
basic S8lL home loan from 80 percent of 
value to 90 percent, raise the maximum 
home loan from $75,000 to $200,000, and 
extend the maximum term from 30 to 40 
years. In addition, theywould permit S&L's to 
allocate as much as 20 percent of their assets 
to consumer loans, and would permitthem to broaden their sources of funds by borrowing 
up to 50 percent of total assets-including, 
within that overall constraint, the elimination 
of previous limits on borrowings through 
commercial paper, mortgage-backed bonds, 
reverse repurchase agreements, and com-
mercial-bank loans. The Bank Board also has 
authorized S&L's to issue credit cards and to 
offer interest-bearing check-type accounts 
(NOW accounts) beginning in 1981. 
Other solutions 
Many observers would contend, however, 
that the best cure for the problems of housing 
would be to wring inflation out of the econ-
omy. As Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker 
recently told the National Association of Mu-
tual Savings Banks, a close relationship exists 
between Switzerland's 4Y2-5 percent mort-
gage money and that country's low rates of 
money growth and inflation. In any case, 
wringing inflation out of the economy could 
defuse much of  the opposition to compensa-
tory devices such as the renegotiable mort-
gage, and conceivably obviate the need for 
them. 
Housing also would benefit from the imple-
mentation of  the recommendations of many 
study groups over the years-especially the 
Hunt Commission of 1971. That commission 
argued for the phase-out of deposit inter-
est-rate ceilings, and also advanced other 
proposals which may be worthy of consider-
ation-including the possible use of tax cre-
dits for investors in residential mortgages, and 
a system of mortgage interest-rate insurance 
to reimburse lenders when market rates rise 
by a certain amount above yields on existing 
portfolios." But the commission also had 
strong views about the proper approach to 
take if "a properly functioning intermediary 
system left housing goals unmet." In that 
event, it said, home buyers and renters shou Id 
be subsidized directly through the Federal 
budget, where costs and benefits are clearly 
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measurable, rather than through a welter of 
differential portfolio and price constraints 
that are riddled with subsidies and taxes of 
uncertain incidence, and which tend to 
"warp" financial institutions and credit 
markets. 
Beyond that, there is the basic question of 
where housing and home finance stand 
among the nation's lengthy list of priorities. 
Most analysts would concede that the fight 
against inflation requires a higher level of 
saving and investment, and an attendant in-
crease in badly lagging productivity. Also, 
they would agree that eliminating deposit 
rate ceilings a priori should increase the flow 
of savings into depository institutions, but 
they might disagree about where those sav-
ings should go. Housing clearly ranks very 
high on the list of  the nation's social needs, 
but it adds nothing directly to the nation's 
industrial capacity, which is so necessary for 
making the nation more productive. 
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Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  +  )/Deficiency (  - ) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  +  )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
7,524  5.8 
8,453  7.9 
1,842  5.9 
7,664  19.6 
1,003  4.4 
851  I- 46.4 
1,246  f- 16.5 
317  2.1 
382  0.9 
185  0.6 
1,816  f- 5.9 
10,869  21.4 
11,253  26.7 
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